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An expected-net-national-benefit-maximizing enlistment-age is analytically derived 
for small countries engaged in external conflicts by considering the effects of the 
enlistment age on army size, probability of war, military performance, forgone 
civilian output, remunerations in the case of injury or death, and costs of readjusting 
to civilian life. The numerical simulations reveal the effects of the model parameters 
on the expected-net-national-benefit-maximizing enlistment-age. Despite the 
substantial changes in parameter values, the computed values of the enlistment age are 
distributed within an advanced phase of life. 
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1. Introduction 
Throughout the course of history countries engaged in external conflicts have 
maintained conscript armies with an early enlistment age—a legacy, perhaps, of our 
long agrarian past where life expectancy was short and boys were hardened by 
physical work, hunting, and protecting their clan’s livestock and crops. Despite the 
considerable increase in the number of years of schooling, in life expectancy and in 
the average age of marriage, despite the transformation in the structure of households 
and earning responsibilities, and despite the changes in warfare technology (which 
have made military operations more sedentary and increased the distance of 
engagement and the accuracy and potency of munitions), the enlistment-age has not 
been significantly changed in countries that have continued practicing compulsory 
military service. Modern males are likely to be swift and powerful at eighteen years of 
age, but their comfortable upbringing does not prepare them mentally for war. 
Enlisted in early age, many experience severe difficulties in coping with national 
expectations, hazardous missions and the horror of war.1 
The suitability and the morality of an early enlistment-age are also disputed on 
political grounds. Most of the pre-service people do not have direct access to political 
power. Consequently, they are politically underrepresented and do not have direct 
influence on current recruitment laws that hinder their personal security and liberty. In 
the absence of adequate, direct political representation, it took years of anti-draft 
demonstrations and civil riots to end the conscription in the United States—a super 
power and one of the most progressive countries—in mid 1973. Small countries that 
                                               
1Anecdotal evidence suggests that in combat situations during World War II only about twenty percent 
of the young combatants returned fire. In contrast, one may note the reliable performance of the 
middle-age troops in Alexander the Macedonian’s army. 
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face severe and close-to-home geopolitical risks cannot afford civil riots. Nor can they 
rely on an all-volunteer army.2 Responsibly, most of their young residents obey the 
existing recruitment rules.  
The construction of a non ad-hoc enlistment-age rule for small countries 
maintaining a conscript defensive army is the objective of this paper. Section 2 
presents the relationship between the army size, deterrence capacity, probability of 
war and the enlistment age. Section 3 details the expected national benefits and costs 
from enlisting at a given age. Section 4 derives the expected-net-national-benefit-
maximizing enlistment-age. Section 5 displays the numerical-simulation’s results of 
the expected-net-national-benefit-maximizing enlistment-age for a wide range of 
parameter-values as well as the effects of the model parameters on this enlistment age. 
Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Enlistment age, army size and war deterrence and probability 
One of the main argument in favor of an early enlistment age is that it allows a 
country facing geopolitical risks to enjoy a large reserve of trained soldiers. Consider 
a country in which military service is compulsory due to hostile geopolitical 
conditions. The physically lower-bound on military service age is mint . The physically 
upper-bound on military service age coincides with the retirement age, maxt . During 
peace-periods, the army is a force of conscripts and its size is equal to the size of the 
                                               
2 Analyses and discussions of the economic issues and the quantity and quality of servicepersons 
associated with the choice of a draft or an all-volunteer force are provided by Oi (1967), Altman and 
Fechter (1967), Fisher (1969), Altman and Barro (1971), Lee and McKenzie (1992), Ross (1994) and 
Warner and Asch (1996, 2001). 
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currently enlisted cohort. At wartime the reserves are called. The reserves comprise 






dntN ττ          (1) 
where ),( maxmin ttt ∈  denotes the drafting age and )(τn  the size of the cohort aged τ . 
Assuming, for tractability, that all cohorts have an identical size, n, then the wartime 
army size is  
ntttN )()( max −= .         (2) 
Suppose that the opponent is more populous, but possesses the same warfare 
technology. For simplicity, its wartime army, EN , is fixed, yet always ready to match 
the smaller country’s army:3 
ntttNN E )()(max minmax −== .       (3) 
In the absence of warfare technological advantage, size is crucial: the greater the ratio 
of the country’s potential wartime army to its rival’s wartime army the higher the 
country’s war deterrence. In other words, the probability of war breaking-out 
( 10 << p ) is given by 
)]/)((1[)( max
ENtNptp µ−=        (4) 
where the scalar 10 << µ  is the army’s deterrent gradient, reflecting (with 1≠µ ) that 
the probability of war cannot be eliminated, and where 10 max << p  is a scalar 
                                               
3 A more elaborate, but greatly complicated, framework may consider reaction functions and a 
Stackelberg-type equilibrium. 
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denoting the probability of war when the country is unarmed. Recalling equation (2), 
the probability of war is rendered as 
)]/()(1[)( minmaxmaxmax ttttptp −−−= µ .                  (5) 
In this framework, the earlier the enlisting age the greater the country’s war-
deterrence and the lower the probability of war. However, additional factors may be 
taken into account in setting the enlistment age.  
 
3. Expected net national benefit from enlistment at age t 
The expected net national benefit (ENNB) from enlisting a person aged 
),( maxmin ttt ∈  is the difference between that person’s military contribution (M) and 
the sum of his forgone civil output (C ), his costs of readjusting to civilian life upon 
release (S), and the remuneration (including hospitalization costs) in the event of his 
injury in war ( IR ) or the remuneration to his kin in the event of his death in war 
( DR ). The probabilities of being injured or killed in war are θ  and φ  ( 1,0 << φθ  
and 1<+ φθ ), respectively, and the probability of war is given by equation (5). Thus, 
the expected net national benefit from enlisting a person aged t is expressed as  
)]()()[()()()()( tRtRtptStCtMtENNB DI φθ +−−−=        (6) 
where M, C, S, IR  and DR  are measured in present-value nominal units.   
Consistent with the life-cycle hypothesis (Ando and Modigliani, 1963; 
Modigliani, 1966), a person’s military contribution and civil output are assumed to be 
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twice differentiable and single-peaked in the interval ),( maxmin tt . Similarly, the 
remuneration paid to kin for a conscript killed in war at age t is taken to be twice 
differentiable and single-peaked in the interval ),( maxmin tt . For convenience, the 
following second-order polynomials are considered: 
2
maxmaxmax
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C  and maxt
DR  are the military contribution and civil output of a 
person aged maxt  and the remuneration to kin for the loss of such a person, 
respectively, and )~,(),
~
,(),~,( γγββαα  are pairs of positive scalars, expressed in 
present-value nominal units, determining the marginal effect of youth and its 
evolution on military contribution, civil output and death remuneration, respectively.  
Let ),( maxmin
* tttm ∈  and ),( maxmin
* tttc ∈  be the prime ages as regards military 
contribution and civil output, respectively, and ),( maxmin
* tttd ∈  the age of death 
associated with maximum remuneration to kin,4 then 
0)(~2)( *max
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4 *dt  may be determined by a combination of the number of life-years lost and the number and age 
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ttttttMtM mt −−−−+= α               (16) 




ttttttCtC ct −−−−+= β              (17) 




DD −−−−+= γ .             (18) 
 It is assumed that in addition to an initial nominal cost IR̂  (in present value) 
of hospitalization, a time-invariant (in present value) remuneration, δ , is paid each 
instance to an injured person, or to his remaining closest relative, over a period that is 
equal to the potential remaining life expectancy had there been no injury, tT − . That 
is, the rehabilitation costs of a person injured at age t are given by  
 8
)(ˆ)( tTRtR II −+= δ .                   (19) 
 The costs of adjusting to civilian life for a released soldier are represented by 
tStS λ+= ˆ)(                     (20) 
where λ  is a positive (negative) scalar if the difficulty in adjusting to civilian life 
increases (decreases) with the conscripted soldier’s age, and where Ŝ  is an age-
insensitive portion of the adjustment costs.  
 By substituting equations (16) to (20) and equation (5) into equation (6), the 
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4. ENNB-maximizing enlistment-age 
Let ot  denote the )}(max{arg tENNB . Recalling equation (20), the necessary 
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If the second-order condition (23) is satisfied, the expected net-national-








= .                  (27)  
If the second-order condition (23) is not satisfied, the expected net-national-benefit 
maximizing enlistment age is either the minimum age mint  (when 
)()( maxmin tENNBtENNB > ) or the maximum age maxt  (when 
)()( maxmin tENNBtENNB < ). 
5. Numerical simulations 
The numerical simulation of the expected net-national-benefit maximizing 
enlistment-age formula (26) considers a country where 18min =t  years, 65max =t  
years, and 80=T  years. The main simulation was performed with medium parameter 
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values for that country. These medium parameters values and the simulation result are 
presented in bold numbers by the middle column of Table 1. The nominal figures are 
per annum.  
[ ]hereTableInsert 1  
The effects of the model parameters on the ENNB maximizing enlistment age 
can be assessed by inspecting the rest of the table’s columns. The entries in these 
columns are computed by changing the value of one parameter at a time from its 
medium level while holding the rest of the parameters at their medium levels.  
In all of the numerical simulations the interior solution was only obtained with 
acabbt o ~2/)~~4
~~
( 2 −−=  and, reasonably, as long as β  sufficiently exceeds λα + . 
In the absence of a clear assessment of the relationship between released soldiers’ 
costs of adjusting to civilian life and age, the medium value of λ was set to be equal 
to zero.   
Despite the substantial parameter change, the numerical simulations reveal 
that the ENNB maximizing enlistment-age results are quite tightly distributed around 
the value obtained with the medium parameter-value vector—55.714 years of age.  
The numerical simulations reveal that the ENNB maximizing enlistment age 
rises with the probability of war when the country is unarmed ( maxp ), with the 
probability of being killed in war (φ ), with the probability of being injured in war 
(θ ), with the army’s war-deterrence gradient ( µ ), with the prime-age of people’s 
civilian production ( *ct ), with the age of death associated with maximum 
remuneration to kin ( *dt ), with the military performance/youth coefficient (α ), with 
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the death remuneration/youth coefficient (γ ), with the annual remuneration extended 
to injured soldiers (δ ), with the correlation between costs of adjusting to civilian life 
and age ( λ ), and with the hospitalization costs of injured soldiers. The ENNB 
maximizing enlistment age declines with the prime-age of people’s military 
performance ( *mt ) and with the civil performance/youth coefficient ( β ). 
Finally, when the upper-bound on recruiting age is lowered from 65 to 60 the 
ENNB-maximizing enlistment-age drops slightly to 53.725. When the upper-bound is 
further reduced to 55 or 50, the ENNB-maximizing enlistment-age is reduced to 
51.426 and 48.632, respectively. 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
Although enlisting at eighteen years of age maximizes army size and, in turn, 
war-deterrence, its application is not necessarily in the best interest of a nation. This 
paper demonstrated that when socioeconomic factors are taken into account, the 
expected net national benefit is maximized by enlisting people in a mature phase of 
their life. This non-orthodox recommendation can be supported by the fact that during 
the years that have passed since World War I warfare has become much more 
sedentary and technical. During the same period, awareness to fitness and health 
services have been improved, life expectancy have been increased, household 
structure has been changed, and the role of men as bread-earners and family-heads has 
been diminished.  
There may be other arguments in favor of enlisting at mature, middle age. The 
most important one is the morality of risking very young people who have not 
contributed significantly to the evolution of their country geopolitical difficulties, who 
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have not tasted much of life, and who may play a significant role in the advancement 
of their nation and the world.  
A compromise between this paper’s non-orthodox recommendation and the 
current practice in countries maintaining a conscript army is a policy of mature-age 
compulsory military service (say, of one year—a period comparable to a sabbatical or 
temporary leave allowed in many places of employment) augmented by an initial 
military training and non-combatant service (say, of one year) at early age (say, 
eighteen) and refreshing training sessions (say, of up to four weeks per year) 
commanded by volunteer career-officers and supported by volunteer professional 
staff, so as to increase a small country’s war-potential army and war-deterrence 
capacity, and where young-soldiers units are deployed to the frontline and battle as 
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Table 1: The numerical simulations’ results 
Parameter     
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Enlisting 
age 
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maxp  











φ   























µ   












mt  (years) 












ct  (years) 












dt  (years) 











α  (dollars) 











β  (dollars) 











γ  (dollars) 











δ  (dollars) 











λ  (dollars) 












ot  (years) 
25,000 
55.349 
50,000 
55.471 
100,000 
55.714 
150,000 
55.958 
200,000 
56.201 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
